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import { normalizePathnameForRouteMatchStrict } from "../routing/utils.js";
import { hasBasePath, stripBasePath } from "../utils/base-path.js";
import { VINEXT_MOUNTED_SLOTS_HEADER, VINEXT_RSC_RENDER_MODE_HEADER } from "./headers.js";
import { normalizePath } from "./normalize-path.js";
import { badRequestResponse, notFoundResponse } from "./http-error-responses.js";
import { guardProtocolRelativeUrl } from "./request-pipeline.js";
import { normalizeMountedSlotsHeader } from "./app-mounted-slots-header.js";
import { APP_RSC_RENDER_MODE_NAVIGATION, parseAppRscRenderMode } from "./app-rsc-render-mode.js";
import { stripRscSuffix } from "./app-rsc-cache-busting.js";
//#region src/server/app-rsc-request-normalization.ts
/**
* Normalize an App Router RSC request.
*
* Performs all security-sensitive and compatibility-sensitive preprocessing before
* route matching. The ordering of steps is security-critical — changing it introduces
* vulnerabilities:
*
* 1. Parse URL
* 2. Protocol-relative URL guard — on the raw pathname, BEFORE normalizePath collapses
* `//` to `/`. If the guard ran after normalization, `//evil.com` → `/evil.com`
* would bypass the check and reach the trailing-slash redirector, which echoes the
* path into a `Location` header that browsers interpret as protocol-relative.
* 3. Strict percent-decode each segment — throws on malformed sequences (→ 400). Must
* run before basePath check so %2F-encoded slashes cannot create fake basePath prefixes.
* 4. Collapse double-slashes, resolve `.` and `..` segments (normalizePath)
* 5. basePath check + strip — 404 when pathname lacks the basePath prefix.
* `/__vinext/` bypasses this for internal prerender endpoints.
* 6. RSC detection: `.rsc` suffix only. RSC headers do not select payload
* rendering at the canonical HTML URL, so caches that ignore Vary cannot
* store Flight responses under HTML URLs.
* 7. cleanPathname — pathname with `.rsc` suffix stripped
* 8. Sanitize X-Vinext-Interception-Context — strip null bytes (header injection)
* 9. Normalize x-vinext-mounted-slots — dedup and sort for canonical cache keys
* 10. Read semantic render mode for refresh/action payload rendering
*
* @returns A 400 or 404 Response for invalid or out-of-scope inputs,
* or a NormalizedRscRequest for valid requests.
*/
function normalizeRscRequest(request, basePath) {
const url = new URL(request.url);
const protoGuard = guardProtocolRelativeUrl(url.pathname);
if (protoGuard) return protoGuard;
let decoded;
try {
decoded = normalizePathnameForRouteMatchStrict(url.pathname);
} catch {
return badRequestResponse();
}
let pathname = normalizePath(decoded);
if (basePath) {
if (!hasBasePath(pathname, basePath) && !pathname.startsWith("/__vinext/")) return notFoundResponse();
pathname = stripBasePath(pathname, basePath);
}
const isRscRequest = pathname.endsWith(".rsc");
const cleanPathname = stripRscSuffix(pathname);
const interceptionContextHeader = request.headers.get("X-Vinext-Interception-Context")?.replaceAll("\0", "") || null;
const mountedSlotsHeader = normalizeMountedSlotsHeader(request.headers.get(VINEXT_MOUNTED_SLOTS_HEADER));
const renderMode = isRscRequest ? parseAppRscRenderMode(request.headers.get(VINEXT_RSC_RENDER_MODE_HEADER)) : APP_RSC_RENDER_MODE_NAVIGATION;
return {
url,
pathname,
cleanPathname,
isRscRequest,
interceptionContextHeader,
mountedSlotsHeader,
renderMode
};
}
//#endregion
export { normalizeMountedSlotsHeader, normalizeRscRequest };
//# sourceMappingURL=app-rsc-request-normalization.js.map